The Concept of Equal Protection of the
Laws-A Historical Inquiryt

EARL A. MALTZ*

Standardaccounts of the intent of the Framersof the fourteenth amendment argue that the equal protection clause was intended to prevent discrimination against certain groups. This Article contends that this argument is based upon an incorrect reading of the historical evidence. The
Article suggests that the primaryfunction of the equal protection clause
was to guaranteea particularright - the right to "'protectionof the laws"
- to all persons rather than to outlaw discriminationgenerally against a
specific class or classes.
INTRODUCTION

Although mainstream theories of the intent of the drafters of the
equal protection clause differ widely, all share one distinctive characteristic. Reading the clause as guaranteeing the protection of equal
laws, each theory sees the concept of equal protection as having been
aimed at the elimination of particularly obnoxious classifications.
Theorists generally differ only in their descriptions of the nature of
the classifications which were intended to be prohibited.
This Article contends that the focus on classification rests on a
misreading of the intent of the drafters. Instead, it argues that the
main thrust of the equal protection clause was to guarantee to all

persons equality in a discrete right laws. The Article begins by outlining
based theories of the drafter's intent.
antecedent of the right to protection

the right to protection of the
the difficulties in classificationIt then identifies the historical
and links those antecedents to
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insight.
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the discussions of the fourteenth amendment in the Thirty-ninth
Congress. The Article concludes with a discussion of the implications
of the theory for intent-based approaches to constitutional law.
THE DIFFICULTIES WITH CONVENTIONAL THEORIES

While varying substantially in detail, mainstream theories of the
intent of the drafters of the equal protection clause generally fall
into two classes. In the first class are "race-focused" theories. The
other group includes what might be called open-ended theories.
Race-focused Theories
The basic premise of the race-focused theories is quite simple: the
Thirty-ninth Congress intended to prohibit only those state actions
which discriminate on the basis of race. Race-focused theorists differ
on the precise extent of this prohibition; while Justice Rehnquist, for
example, would read the fourteenth amendment to prohibit all discrimination on the basis of race,1 Raoul Berger sees the drafters as
having intended to prohibit only certain types of racial discrimination.2 Regardless of the differing views on the extent of prohibition,
the basic premise remains the same - the drafters intended to reach
only classifications which were based on race or national origin.
To support their position, race-focused theorists rely primarily on
contextual arguments. They argue that the main concern of Congress was protecting the civil rights of newly-freed slaves in southern
states, and that this concern is reflected not only in the discussion of
the fourteenth amendment itself, but also in other legislation and
discussions during the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress.
Thus, given the fact that, on its face, the meaning of "equal protection of the laws" is unclear, race-focused theorists contend that the
most plausible conclusion is that Congress intended to prohibit only
racial discrimination.
Even in purely contextual terms, race-focused theories suffer from
substantial difficulties. Admittedly, much of the discussion of the
proposed equal protection clause focused on the infamous black
codes; 3 however, the debates contain a number of references to the
mistreatment of abolitionists and white unionists. 4 Given these references, race-focused theories seem unduly limited.
Even more damning are the textual arguments against the race1. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-27 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., joining dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.)
2. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 18-19 (1977).
3.

For a description of the black codes, which sharply reduced the rights of the
WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965).
4. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158, 1065 (1865) (remarks of
Rep. Bingham).

freed slaves, see T.
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focused theories. The drafters of the fourteenth amendment were capable of addressing racial discrimination directly and specifically
when they chose to do so. For example, both the Freedman's Bureau
Bill and Civil Rights Bill of 1866 explicitly prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race. 5 Moreover, the current language of section 16
was adopted as a substitute for a simple prohibition against racial
discrimination in civil rights. 7 Thus, the only plausible conclusion is
that the drafters of the fourteenth amendment apparently had some
other goal in mind.
Open-ended Theories
Open-ended theories of the drafters' intent provide the major alternative to race-focused analysis. Open-ended theorists argue that,
rather than simply prohibiting discrimination against some particular group, the equal protection clause was intended to embody the
general concept that unfair discrimination against any class was unconstitutional. 8 Their arguments are based upon the language of the
equal protection clause and/or the drafters' perceived reliance on
natural law concepts of equality. Open-ended theorists differ on precisely what concept of fairness is embodied in the equal protection
clause; among the more popular theories are that the clause prohibits
discrimination against "discrete and insular minorities" 9 and that
the clause prohibits classifications which stigmatize the disadvantaged group. 10 The basic theme of open-ended theories, however, is
always the same: the drafters' intention was to constitutionalize an
open-ended theory of fair classification whose details would be filled
in over time.
While facially plausible, such theories suffer from insuperable contextual difficulties. The major problem is the impact which an openended fourteenth amendment would have on the allocation of authority between the state and national governments. Of course, the
entire point of section 1 was to impose some new constraints on state
5. For the text of the relevant portion of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, see CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1866). For the text of the relevant portion of the
Freedman's Bureau Bill, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3118 (1866).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7.

See B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION

106 (Negro Press ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as J. JOINT COMMITTEE].
8. See, e.g., J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 73-104 (1983); Sed-

ler, The Legitimacy Debate in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 126-37 (1983).
9.

10.

See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980).

See J. BAER, supra note 8, at 73-103.

authority. But while under a race-focused approach, the new constraints would be rigidly circumscribed, open-ended theories raise
the possibility that some branch of the national government has the
authority to use an amorphous, changing principle to apply ever-increasing restraints on state autonomy. Thus, if the drafters of the
equal protection clause in fact intended that it be open-ended, they
must have contemplated a veritable revolution in American
federalism.
The political ideology of the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress makes it extremely unlikely that they advocated such a reallocation of authority. Admittedly, the Civil War had sounded the
death nell for the most extreme theories of state sovereignty; moreover, the exigencies of the Civil War had inspired unprecedented assumptions of power by the central government. But all Congressmen
-

even the most radical Republicans -

remained committed to the

concept of federalism.11 Further, moderate Republicans, who effectively controlled the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, 12 were
committed to the concept of a reconstructed nation where state governments retained effective control over most matters. This conviction emerged dramatically in the Senate debate over the appropriateness of decisive federal action to combat the spread of cholera.
A bill was introduced which would have formed the Secretaries of
War, Navy, and Treasury into a commission with powers to impose
stringent quarantine measures at ports of entry, to establish sanitary
cordons in interior areas, and to use the military to enforce the commissioner's decrees.13 If ever there were occasions for centralized coordinated intervention, the battle against cholera was one. As both
supporters and opponents ruefully noted, cholera was a respecter of
neither state lines nor states' rights. 14 Further, a rigid quarantine in
the port of New York, for example, would be useless if Philadelphia
were lax in its health measures.1 5 Nonetheless, the bill was defeated
by a coalition of Democrats and moderate and conservative Republicans. The essence of their objections was captured by John Grimes,
the influential Senate Moderate from Iowa who stated:
[T]he time is gone... to legislate in the manner which [the cholera] bill
proposes. During the war... we drew to ourselves... as the Federal government powers which had been considered doubtful by all and denied by
many ....

That time... has creased and ought to cease. Let us go back to

11. See H.

GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 312 (1968).
12. For fuller explanations of the complex political situation in the early Reconstruction Era, see M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1974); C McKITRICK,
ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960).
13. See generally H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 393-96 (1973).
14. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2484 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 2485 (remarks of Sen. Morrill).
15. See id. at 2445, 2585.
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the original condition of things and allow the States to take care of themselves. . . . Yes,
16 sir, take care of their own cholera. My state will take care
of its cholera.

The same commitment to federalism and the concept of state autonomy was evident in the attitude of the Moderates toward civil
rights measures. These concerns emerged most dramatically in the
debates of an early proposal to arm Congress with authority to "secure to all persons. . .equal protection in the rights of life, liberty
and property." The proposal was postponed (never to reemerge) after more conservative Moderates argued that it would unduly concentrate authority in the hands of the federal government.' 7
Given this commitment to federalism, it is unlikely that the drafters intended the type of revolutionary changes envisioned by openended theorists. Further, were such changes intended, the fourteenth
amendment would have been an unlikely vehicle. The amendment
was not simply, or even primarily, intended to be a guarantee of individual rights; instead, it was designed to be the cornerstone of a
comprehensive Reconstruction program around which all Republicans would unite in the elections of 1866.18 As such, its form reflected a delicate series of political compromises designed to attract
not only Radicals, but also the more conservative of the Moderates.
Inclusion of an open-ended provision, with its drastic implications for
federalism, would have alienated important segments of the Republican Party. The fourteenth amendment was intended to be a unifying
force, thus deliberate inclusion of such a controversial provision
seems unlikely.
One possible explanation for the language of section 1 is that it
was a concession to the Radicals in order to gain their support for
the remainder of the proposal. This theory is implausible for a variety of reasons. First, the Radicals plainly considered other sections
critical. For example, the archradical Thaddeus Stevens stated that
section 2 was, "the most important in the [proposed amendment]."' 1

Further, resisting Moderate efforts to remove section 3 as reported
by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, he snarled, "give us section three or give us nothing. 20

THE

16. Id. at 2446.
17. See infra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., M. BENEDICT, supra note 12, at 169-87; J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 91-116 (1956); C. McKITRICK, supra note 12, at 326-64;

Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as PoliticalCompromise: Section One in the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933 (1984).
19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
20. Id. at 2544.

Second, and even more decisive, is the fact that the current wording of section 1 is clearly of Moderate origin. In the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, the language was adopted in place of wording
which would have prohibited "discrimination . . .as to the civil
rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. ' 21 The substitution was supported in the Committee by all of
22
the Democrats and almost all of the moderate Republicans voting
the very men who were least likely to countenance drastic alterations in the balance of power between the state and national governments. By contrast, the majority of the opposing votes came from the
more radical elements of the Joint Committee.23
Summary
In short, neither race-focused theories nor open-ended theories of
the equal protection clause provide persuasive explanations of the
drafters' intent. Race-focused theories are inconsistent with the language of the equal protection clause; by contrast, while seemingly
consistent with that language, open-ended theories are implausible in
view of the context in which the fourteenth amendment was adopted.
The remainder of this Article describes an alternative theory of the
drafters' intent which, I believe, avoids both of these problems.
EQUALITY AND PROTECTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT

The Concept of Equality
The rhetoric of equality figured prominently in the Congressional
debates over section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. This rhetoric,
however, did not simply emerge suddenly in the post-war era. Instead, it had its origins in the antebellum campaign of the abolitionists, and was later adopted in the pre-war era by the nascent Republican Party. Thus, in order to understand the usages of the term
"equality" in the post-war debates, one must first examine the
21. J. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 106 n.135.
22. The three Democrats were Senator Reverdy Johnson and Representatives Andrew Rogers and Henry Grider. The moderate Republicans favoring the change were
Senator George Williams and Representatives John Bingham, Roscoe Conkling, and
Henry Blow. The only Moderate defector was Senator John Grimes.
The change was also supported by three Radicals - Representatives Thaddeas Stevens, Elihu Washburne, and George Boutwell. Their support is best understood as an
attempt to placate the Moderates and gain support for the Radical-sponsored section 3.
See Maltz, supra note 18, at 963-64.
23. The three Committee members who opposed the change were Senators John
Grimes and Jacob Howard and Representative Justin Morrill. Howard was a thoroughgoing Radical. See J. JAMES, supra note 18, at 45. Morrill's politics were more complex;

but although he sometimes sided with Moderates, he was more often in the Radical
camp during the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress. See M.
12, at 351.

BENEDICT,

supra note
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arguments put forward
during the half century immediately preced24
ing the Civil War.
The theory of racial equality was, of course, central to the abolitionists' claim that slavery should be abolished immediately. This

theory was put in its simplest form in the instructions to Theodore
Weld which accompanied his commission as an agent of the Ameri-

can Anti-Slavery Society in 1833:
People of Color are to be emancipated and recognized as citizens, and their
rights secured as such, equal in all respects to others, according to the cardinal principle of the American Declaration of Independence. Of course,
we have nothing to do with any equal laws which the states may25 make, to
punish vagrancy, idleness, and crime, either in whites or blacks.

Taken at face value, statements such as this implied that all legal
distinctions based on color should be abolished, a theory of "total

racial equality." Indeed, a minority of abolitionists (and later
Republicans) pressed this position.26 Those making such arguments,
however, were immediately confronted with a powerful countervailing social force-the widespread negrophobia which gripped

early nineteenth-century

America.27 This phenomenon worked

against advocates of total racial equality in two ways. First, the dis-

trust of blacks shaped the political opinions of many who were in the

forefront of the antislavery movement.2 8 Second, even if a particular.

politician believed personally in the concept of total racial equality,
he might likely be loathe to press that position for fear of incurring

adverse political consequences.29
These factors led most antislavery activists to couch their position
in different terms. Rather than total racial equality, a "limited abso-

lute equality" was more commonly advocated. The argument was
24. For more detailed discussions of these theories, see H. GRAHAM, supra note
II, at 152-242; J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 33-142 (enlarged ed. 1965).
25. 1 LETTERS OF THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, ANGELINA GRIMKE WELD, AND
SARAH GRIMKE 126 (G. Bainer & D. Dumond eds. 1934).
26. See Brief for Plaintiff, Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198,
201-04 (1849), reprintedin CHARLES SUMNER, His COMPLETE WORKS 51-100 (1849); C.
OLCOTT. Two LECTURES ON THE SUBJECT OF SLAVERY AND ABOLITION (1838); S.P.
Chase, The Address and Reply on the Presentation of a Testimonial to S.P. Chase by the
Colored People of Cincinnati (1845).
27. See, e.g., E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 261-300 (1970); L.
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 15-23 (1961); V. J. VOEGLI, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL 1-9
(1967).
28. See, e.g., L. LITWACK, supra note 27, at 269-70; Speech of Hon. Lyman
Trumbull on the Politics of the Day, in Springfield, Il1. (June 19, 1857); CONG. GLOBE,
36th Cong., Ist Sess. 1683 (1860) (remarks of Sen. Harlan).
29. See, e.g., E. FONER, supra note 27, at 261-62; L. LITWACK, supra note 27, at
269-70.

based on the proposition that all men were equally entitled to certain

natural rights-life, liberty, and property. The antislavery forces argued that slavery was inconsistent with natural law because the in-

stitution denied these rights to a certain class of men-the black
slaves."0 The first edition of the Anti-Slavery Record provides a classic example of this position:
[W]hat do abolitionists mean when they cite the Declaration of Independence for the proposition "that all men are created equal?" That men are
physically equal? That they are equal in wealth and learning? That
criminals shall not be deprived of their liberty? No. They mean, according
to the plain dictates of common sense, that, in coming into this world, and
going through it, all men shall have an equal and fair chance to exercise all
their powers of body and mind for their own happiness. Of course, they
mean that no man shall encroach upon another. That one man shall have as
good a right to acquire wealth as another. That one parent shall have as
good a right to the services of his own children as another. That every wife
shall be in subjection to her own husband, and to no one else; and that no
man shall be deprived of his liberty or an alleged crime "without due process of law." Slavery violates natural equality in all these respects; and in
the last respect, it is not only contrary to our Declaration of Independence,
but to the Constitution of the United States. 31

Tactically, the use of the model of limited absolute equality
yielded considerable advantages to the antislavery movement. Perhaps most importantly, the basic concept of limited absolute equality
was deeply imbedded in the American political/legal culture. The
theory was enshrined not only in the Declaration of Independence,
but in many state constitutions as well. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 contained a typical provision:
[A]II men are born equally, free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and
32 defending
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.

Thus, one sees two concepts of equality were expressed by aboli-

tionists and Republicans in the antebellum era. The total racial
equality theory argued that race was simply an inappropriate basis
for governmental classification. The second, the more popular and
politically palatable conception of limited absolute equality suggested that all men had certain "natural rights," derived from either
general natural law, the Declaration of Independence, and/or the
Constitution, and that government could no more deprive blacks of
these rights than it could deprive any other class of men of these
30. See. e.g., E. FONER, supra note 27, at 291-92; R. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM
229-30 (1963).
31. 1 ANTISLAVERY RECORD 8 (1835). See also CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1685 (1860) (remarks of Sen. Wilson); Fisher, Of the Distinction Between Natural
and Political Rights, 86 NEW ENGLANDER 1 (1864).
32. PA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 8 W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DocUMENTS OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONS 292 (1979); see also, e.g. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 8 W. SWINDLER, supra, at 2050; VA. CONST. art. I § 1, reprintedin 10 W.
SWINDLER, supra, at 68.
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rights. The key question is which concept of equality the drafters of
the fourteenth amendment intended to embody in their proposal.
In answering this question, the precise wording of the amendment
is important. Section 1 does not mandate equality of rights generally
or even equality before the law. It merely requires that states provide
"equal protection of the laws." As set forth below, the concept of
equal protection had a generally accepted special meaning in the
mid-nineteenth century, related to, but analytically separate from,
the notion of equal rights generally.
The Origins of the Right to Protection
Like the idea of limited absolute equality, the concept of a right to
protection is deeply rooted in Anglo-American jurisprudence.3 3 The
basic underpinning of the concept is the social contract theory which
dominated nineteenth-century political thought. Under this theory,
the right to protection by the sovereign authority is the quid pro quo
which inhabitants received for giving up some of the rights which
they possessed in the state of nature. In the shorthand of the era,
allegiance is the obligation of the citizen and protection the obligation of the sovereign.34
The allegiance/protection equation made early appearances in
even earlier British legal materials. In 1608, Lord Coke made the
reciprocal obligations of allegiance and protection an explicit point in
his opinion in Calvin's Case.35 Blackstone later made much the same
point, arguing that
[T]he original contract of society [is] that the whole should protect all its
parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or,
in other words, that the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for the
protection) each individual should
submit to the laws of the community. 6

and that
[T]he principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment
of. . .rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature;
but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance
33. For other discussions focusing on the content of the concept of protection, see
Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the Laws; The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F.
385 (1966); Willing, Protection by Law Enforcement: The Emerging Constitutional
Right, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1982).
34.

See, e.g., KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-

1870 passim (1978); Speech of Harrison Gray Otis Yates, Rights of Colored Men to
Suffrage, Citizenship, and Trial by Jury 47 (1838).
35.

36.

7 COKE 1 (1608).
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47.

and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social
communities. 37

The same concepts were equally influential on the American
scene. Theorists as diverse as John Calhoun and Francis Leiber
plainly subscribed to the allegiance/protection equation. 38
Kent's Commentaries also featured the right of protection prominently noting that "[t]he personal security of every citizen is protected from lawless violence by the arm of the government and
the. . .penal code"; 39 . . .that "[e]very person is entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of his property"; and "[t]his duty of protecting every man's property by means of just laws, promptly, uniformly,
and impartially administered, is one of the strongest and most interesting of obligations on the part of government. ....

Similarly,

many early state constitutions included specific provisions guaranteeing the right to protection, 4 ' with Ohio being the first to use the term
"equal protection" in 1850.42 Finally, in discussions of the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV of the federal Constitution, [the
comity clause] cases such as Corfield v. Coryell4 a and Campbell v.
Morris44 identified a right to government protection of person and
property analytically distinct from such interests as the rights to pursue lawful occupations
and the right to acquire and hold real and
45
personal property.
Given the prominence of the right to protection in nineteenth-century thought, the key question is what interests were embraced by
that right. This question in turn can be broken into two components.
The first is the issue of what persons could effectively assert a right
to protection of the law. From the contract-based origin of the right,
one might assume that only citizens could claim this protection.
37.

2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124.
38. See 2 F. LIEBER, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 177-78 (1880); remarks of John
C. Calhoun, April 2, 1836, reprinted in 13 PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 128 (Wilson
ed. 1980).
It should be noted that despite his position on the concept of the reciprocal obligations
of allegiance and protection, Calhoun did not base his theory on the concept of natural
rights. See generally J. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (Poli. Sci. Classics

ed. 1947).
39. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *15.
40. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *331, 333-34.
41. R.I. CONST. art. 1,§ 2, reprinted in 8 W. SWINDLER, supra note 32, at 387;
VA. CONST. art. 1, § 3, reprinted in 10 W. SWINDLER, supra note 32, at 68.
42. OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 2, reprintedin 7 W. SWINDLER, supra note 32, at 558.
43. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
44. 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797).
45. See also 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES app. 77-79 (Tucker ed. 1803)
(although slaves should be freed, they should not be allowed to hold real property; their
limited rights, however, should be under "protection of the laws"); Letter from William
Heighton to George Stearns (Feb. 27, 1865), in The Equality of Men Before the Law
Claimed & Defended in Speeches by William D. Kelley, Wendell Phillips and Frederich
Douglas (Boston 1865).
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Such an assumption would, however, be incorrect. Relying on a concept of limited-implied allegiance, nineteenth-century authorities
were unanimous in concluding that lawfully resident aliens also had
a right to the protection of the sovereign authority. Only outlaws and
slaves were denied this right.46
The other central issue concerns the interests that were covered
under the rubric of the right to protection of the law. Obviously, the
right to protection must embrace the ability to be protected from
personal aggression by other persons within the sovereign's territory,
as well as to hold property within that territory free from such aggression. The right comes most clearly into play when the government is called upon to resist a hostile invasion; with respect to citizens, mid-nineteenth-century thought also clearly posited a right to
protection of one's government even while within the territorial jurisdiction of some other government.4"
Another strand of the nineteenth-century concept of the right to
protection derives from the somewhat ambiguous position of government itself. On one hand, government exists largely to protect life,
liberty, and property. But on the other, the government is potentially
one of the greatest threats to these interests. Personal liberty is directly threatened by the power to imprison, and the right to take
property by the powers of taxation and eminent domain.48
Kent dealt with this problem by describing a right to protection
from government as well as by government. In the context of life and
liberty, he viewed the former right as being embodied in the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights as well as the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. In the context of property
interests, the citizens' right to protection was viewed as including a
right to be free from "unequal and undue assessments" and to obtain
compensation for property seized for public use.49
In the landmark decision of Ex Parte Milligan,50 decided contemporaneously with the drafting of section 1, the majority opinion relied eloquently on this concept. Finding that a military tribunal had
no jurisdiction to try and convict a civilian in a loyal state, Justice
46. See, e.g., Clark v. Morey, 10 Johns 68 (N.Y. 1813); Russell v. Skipwith, 6
Binn. 241 (Pa. 1814); J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *62-63; 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES app. 98 (Tucker ed. 1803).
47. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1090 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bing-

ham); 10
48.
49.
50.

Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 404 (1862).
See generally J. CALHOUN, supra note 38.
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *331-332, 339.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See also 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 393-94 (1862).
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Davis argued:
[lI]t is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime to
be tried and punished according to law. The power of punishment is alone
the means through which the laws have provided for the purpose and if they
are ineffectual, there is an immunity from punishment. . .By the protection
of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection and they are
at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people. 5

In short, by the mid-nineteenth century, American jurisprudence
and political thought clearly recognized the existence of an individual right to protection. Further, this right was multifaceted, encompassing not only a right to be protected by government but alsofrom
government. The next subsection will examine the use of that concept in the pre-Reconstruction debates over black rights.

The Right to Protection and the Rights of Blacks
Not surprisingly, abolitionists seized on the right to protection as a
central feature of their argument against slavery. Protection of the
laws was viewed as the antithesis of slavery itself. Thus, the grant of
equal protection to blacks would automatically bring an end to the
institution. From the abolitionist perspective, the necessary protec-

tion for blacks had three components. First, the law should formally
provide that the life, liberty, and property of blacks would be protected. Second, blacks should have access to the courts to gain redress for violation of these protective laws. Third, the government
should provide actual physical protection for blacks and their fundamental rights. Henry Stanton's 1837 argument against the maintenance of slavery in the District of Columbia is particularly evocative:
Having robbed the slave of himself, and thus made him a thing, Congress is
consistent in denying to him all of the protection of the law as a man. His
labor is coerced by laws of Congress; no bargain is made, no wage is given.
His provender and covering are at the will of the owner. His domestic and
social rights are as entirely disregarded in the eye of the law as if the Deity
had never instituted the enduring relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, brother and sister. There is not the shadow of legal protection or the
family state among the slaves of the district. . .neither is there any real
protection for the lives and limbs of the slaves. . . . No slave can be a
party before a judicial tribunal. . .in any species of action against any person, no matter how atrocious may have been the injury received. He is not
known to the law as a person: much less, a person having civil rights. The
master may murder by system, with complete immunity, if he perpetrates
his deeds only in the presence of colored persons. . . . Congress should immediately restore to every slave, the ownership of his own body, mind, and
soul, transfer from things without rights to men with rights. . . [t]he slaves
should be legally protected in life and limb, in his earnings, his family and
social relations, and his conscience. To give impartial legal protection in
[the] District to all of its inhabitants would annihilate slavery. Give the
slave then, equal legal protection with his master, and at its first approach
51.

71 U.S. at 118-19.
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slavery and2 the slavery trade flee in panic as the darkness before the fullorbed sun.1

Although the comity clause was generally featured more prominently, the right to protection was also at times used by antebellum
Republicans to criticize restrictions on free blacks. In this respect
the 1858 debate over the admission of Oregon was typical. The proposed state constitution of Oregon outlawed slavery but also prohibited the immigration of free blacks into the state. In addition, the
constitution barred all blacks from access to the courts. Most of the
race-related criticism of the proposed constitution focused on the
claim that the immigration restriction violated the comity clause.
Some Republicans, however, also argued that even if the immigration restriction was acceptable, the ban in court access would be objectionable on the independent ground that it effectively denied the
protection of law to blacks who might legitimately be in Oregon on
temporary business.53
But the abolitionists did not seek protection only for blacks; they
also sought it for themselves. The doctrine of abolitionism was extremely unpopular, not only in the slave states, but in many free
states as well. Thus, abolitionists were often subject to mob violence
and sought protection for their own rights of life, liberty, and property. Often, such protection was denied by unsympathetic54 government agencies, who at times even encouraged mob action.
Abolitionist literature is replete with complaints of this lack of
government protection. Typical was the plea of L.P. Lovejoy, one of
the martyrs of the abolitionist movement who was a victim of mob
violence in Alton, Illinois in 1837. Shortly before his death, he voiced
this argument to a delegation of the people of Alton:
I.

.

.have not desired, or asked any compromise. I have asked for nothing

but to be protected in my rights as a citizen-rights which God has given
men, which are guaranteed to me by the Constitution of my country. Have

I, sir, been guilty of any infraction of the laws? Whose good name have I

injured? When and where have I published anything injurious to the reputation of Alton? . .. What, sir, I ask has been my offense? Put your finger

upon it-define it-and I can stand ready to answer for it. If I have com-

mitted any crime, you can easily convict me. You have public sentiment in

your favor. You have your juries, and you have your attorney.

.

.and I have

52. Remarks by Henry Stanton before the Massachusetts House of Representatives (Feb. 23 & 24, 1837), reprinted in E. BORMANN, FORERUNNERS OF BLACK POWER:
THE RHETORIC OF ABOLITION 63-64 (1971). See also C. OLCOTT, supra note 26, at 44;
Philanthropist, Jan. 27, 1837, at 3, col. 2.
53. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1967 (1858) (remarks of Sen.
Wilson).
54. See R. NYE, supra note 30, at 174-218.

no doubt you can convict me. But if I have been guilty of no violation of

law, why am I hunted up and down continually like a partridge upon the
mountains? Why am I threatened with the tar barrel? Why am I waylaid
every day, and from night to night, and my life in jeopardy every hour?...
I plant myself, sir, down on my unquestionable rights, and the question to
be decided is, whether I shall be protected in the exercise and enjoyment of
those rights. . .whether my property shall be protected, whether I shall be
suffered to go home to my family at night without being assailed, and

threatened with tar and feathers, and assasination; whether my afflicted
wife, whose life has been in jeopardy, from continued alarm and excitement, shall night after night be driven from a sick bed into the garret to
save her life from the brickbats and violence of the mobs. ... o

In short, references of the right to protection of the law and equal
protection were prominent in the arguments of antebellum antislavery activists. The structure of these arguments, however, also reflected the limits of the nineteenth-century conception of equal protection as a vehicle for ensuring racial equality. For this right was
largely parasitic outside a very narrow compass; the government's
obligation to provide protection was triggered only by the existence
of some other legal interest. Such interests might be established extrinsically either by natural or positive law. But the key point is that
the right to protection (or equality of protection) was not itself commonly viewed as implying a generalized right to equal treatment.
This point emerged clearly in Roberts v. City of Boston.56 Roberts
was an 1849 challenge to the maintenance of segregated schools in
Boston. Arguing for the plaintiff, Charles Sumner relied in part on
the provision of the Massachusetts Constitution which provided that
"[A]ll men are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential, and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties." This provision,
Sumner contended, established the proposition that whites and
blacks were "equal before the law" and, since in his view segregated
schools were by their nature unequal, the maintenance of separate
schools violated the state constitution.
Chief Justice Shaw, although accepting the argument that the
state constitutional provision established equality before the law, rejected the claim that the maintenance of segregated schools was unconstitutional. Shaw concluded:
The great principle. . .is that by the constitution and laws of Massachusetts all persons. . .are equal before the law. This, as a broad general principle. .. is perfectly sound;. . . But when this great principle comes to be
applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not

warrant the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed with the
55. J.C. LOVEJOY & 0. LOVEJOY, MEMOIR OF THE REV. ELIJAH LOVEJOY: WHO
WAS MURDERED IN THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY OF THE PRESS AT ALTON, ILLINOIS, Nov.

7. 1837, at 279-80 (1838). See also The Liberator, May 31, 1844, at 2, col. 1; The
Emancipator, July 22, 1834, at 2, col. 2.
56. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
57. Brief, supra note 26, at 55-66, 70-81.
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same civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to
have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only that
the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternalconsiderationand protection of the law, for their maintenance and security. What those rights are, to which individuals, in the
infinite variety of circumstances by which they are surrounded in society,
are entitled,8 must depend on laws adapted to their respective relations and
conditions.

The standard analysis of the Roberts case describes Sumner as a
hero whose argument presaged the conceptions of racial equality
later embodied in the fourteenth amendment and Shaw as a villain
whose retrograde views on the nature of equality were to haunt
American jurisprudence for one hundred years. 59 But in structure
Shaw's opinion simply reflects the dichotomy between the concepts
of equality of rights and equality of protection respectively, which
appears in antebellum arguments. All men -black or white-are
equally entitled to protection of the laws to enforce their legal rights;
but unless a particular interest can be classified as a natural right,
the legislature may withhold that interest from any class at will.
Since public education is not a natural right, the legislature would
not violate the principle of limited absolute equality even if blacks
were totally excluded.
In short, antebellum concepts of limited absolute equality and protection of the laws suggest that the equal protection clause was intended to have a somewhat limited scope. The next subsection will
examine the views of the principle proponent of the equal protection
language in the Thirty-ninth Congress.
THE VIEWS OF JOHN BINGHAM

Any serious attempt to understand the intended meaning of the
equal protection clause must closely examine the theories of John A.
Bingham, an Ohio Republican, who served in the House of Representatives from 1855 to 1863 and 1865 to 1876. Bingham initially
proposed a constitutional amendment to secure "equal protection."
Further, he continually pressed for such an amendment in the face
of initial defeat in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and on
the House floor. Thus, to the extent that one can attribute authorship of legislation to any one person, the credit for section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment belongs to Bingham.
58. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 206 (emphasis added).
59.

See J. BAER, supra note 8, at 77; H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE
95-96 (1982); L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
SHAW 108-17 (1957).

UNDER LAW

JUSTICE

The Pre-ReconstructionEra
Bingham's interest in the concepts embodied in section 1 began to
emerge well before the Reconstruction era. One can trace the evolution of his thinking in this area to a number of speeches which he
gave in the House between 1856 and 1862. These speeches contain
references to all of the major elements of section 1. For example, in
1858 Bingham argued that the privileges and immunities language
of the comity clause placed natural rights - the rights to life, liberty, and property - beyond the control of the state governments. 0
And in 1856 he attributed a substantive content to the due process
clause of the fifth amendment; attacking a Kansas territorial statute
which made it illegal to utter any "sentiment calculated to induce
slaves to escape from the service of their masters," he argued that
the statute was unconstitutional because it "abridges the freedom of
speech and of the press, and deprives persons of liberty 6' without
due
1
process of law, or any process but that of brute force."
For purposes of understanding the equal protection clause, two aspects of Bingham's early speeches are particularly important. First,
the concept of equality was a consistent theme of Bingham's early
speeches. These speeches, however, reveal that he adhered to the
concept of limited absolute equality rather than total racial equality.
This point was revealed clearly in 1859 when he stated:
Nobody proposes or dreams of political equality any more than of physical
or mental equality. It is as impossible for men to establish equality in these
respects as it is for "the Ethiopian to change his skin." Who would say that
all men are equal in stature, in weight, and in physical strength; or that all
are equal in natural mental force, or in intellectual requirements? Who, on
the other hand, will be bold enough to deny that all persons are equally

entitled to the enjoyment of the rights of life and liberty and property; and
that no one should be deprived of life or liberty but as punishment for

crimes; nor of his property against his consent and without due compensation. . . [E]quality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue
and to utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their

toil, is the rock on which the Constitution rests-its sure foundation and
defense. .

.

. The charm of that Constitution lies in the great democratic

idea which is embodied, that all men, before the laws, are equal in respect
of those rights which God gives and no6 2 man or State may rightfully take
away except as a forfeiture for crimes.

The second key point is that Bingham plainly viewed the right to
protection as a separate right. In 1857 he stated that, "it must be
apparent that the outward equality of all and the equalprotection of
each, are principles of any Constitution, which ought to be observed
and enforced." 6 3 In 1859, he defined the privileges and immunities of
60. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong.,
34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 140 (1857).
61. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess.
62. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., Ist Sess.
63. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess.

2d Sess. 985-86 (1859); CONG. GLOBE,
app. 124 (1856).
985 (1859).
app. 140 (1857).
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citizens of the United States as including both "the rights of life,
liberty and property,
and their due protection in the enjoyment
64
thereof by law."1
Thus, the basic elements which eventually emerged in section 1
were clearly evident in Bingham's thought prior to the Reconstruction era. His development of these concepts, however, did not reach
full fruition until the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress,
which grappled with the problem of Reconstruction in late 1865 and
early 1866.
Bingham in the First Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress
In assessing the development of the fourteenth amendment, one
must take into account important political changes in Bingham's position between 1862 and 1865. Prior to the Civil War, Bingham was
known as a Radical. During the Reconstruction Era, however, he
was one of the leading Moderates in Congress.6 It is against this
background that his proposals must be considered.
Bingham's first equal protection proposal was submitted to the
first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress on December 6, 1865. The
proposal would have amended the Constitution to empower Congress
to pass "all necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in
every state equal protection in their rights of life, liberty, and property." 66 Bingham gave a detailed explanation of the purpose of this
proposed amendment in a speech delivered on the House floor on
January 9, 1866. The speech was a response to a Democratic discussion of a message from President Andrew Johnson in which Johnson
had declared himself in favor of "equal and exact justice to all
men." After accusing the Democrats of being in favor of equal and
exact justice only for white men, Bingham continued:
The spirit, the intent, the purpose of our Constitution is to secure equal and
exact justice to all men. That has not been done. It has failed to be done in
the past. It has failed in respect of white men as well as black men. . .time

was within the memory of every man now within the hearing of my voice,
when it was entirely unsafe for a citizen of Massachusetts or Ohio who was
known to be the friend of the human race, the avowed advocate of the foundation principle of our Constitution - the absolute equality of all men
before the law-to be found anywhere in the streets of Charleston or in the
streets of Richmond.
To be sure, it was not because the Constitution of the United States
64.

CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1859).
65. See, e.g., D. DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION
COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 183-85.
66. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865).

62 (1965); J. JOINT

sanctioned any infringement of his rights in that behalf, but because in defiance of the Constitution its very guarantees were disregarded ...
When you come to weigh these words "equal and exact justice to all men,"
go read, if you please, the words of the Constitution itself: "the citizens of
each State of the Union (being ipso facto citizens of the United States)
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens (supplying
the ellipsis 'of the United States') in the several States." [This guarantee]
was utterly disregarded in the past by South Carolina when she drove with
indignity and contempt and scorn from her limits the honored representative of Massachusetts, who went hither upon the peaceful mission of asserting in the tribunal of South Carolina the rights of American citizens.
I propose. . .that hereafter there shall not be any disregard of the essential
guarantee of your Constitution in any State of the Union. . . [b]y simply
adding an amendment to the Constitution. . .giving to Congress the power
to pass all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons. . .their equal
personal rights; and if the tribunals of South Carolina will not respect the
rights of the citizens of Massachusetts under the Constitution. . .I desire to
see the Federal Judiciary clothed with the power to take cognizance of the
question and assert those rights by solemn judgment, inflicting upon the
offenders such penalties as will compel a decent respect for this guarantee
to all the citizens of every State. . . . [T]he divinest feature of your Constitution is the recognition of the absolute equality before the law of all persons, whether citizens or strangers. . .subject only to the exception made by
reason of slavery, now happily abolished. The President, therefore, might
well say, as he does say in his message, that "The American system rests on
the assertion of the equal right of every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness; to freedom of conscience, to the culture and exercise of all his
faculties."
I propose, then, sir, by amending the Constitution, to provide for the efficient enforcement, by law, of these "equal rights of every
man," and upon
the assertion of which. . .the American system rests.67

This speech plainly reflects the concept of limited absolute equality. First, it totally destroys any contention that Bingham viewed the
concept of equal protection only in terms of discrimination on the
basis of race. Bingham did refer to the denial of "equal justice" to
the freed slaves; the only allusion to specific unconstitutional state
behavior, however, was his clear reference to the celebrated Samuel
Hoar affair. Hoar-a white man-had been sent to South Carolina
by the governor of Massachusetts to test the constitutionality of the

infamous Negro Seamen Acts. 8 On his arrival in Charleston, the
state legislature passed a resolution demanding his explusion. A mob
assembled for this purpose. After consultation with a number of
leading citizens of the city, Hoar left South Carolina without attempting to accomplish his mission.69 Given that Bingham explicitly
67.
68.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-58 (1866).
For an account of the struggle over the Negro Seamen Acts, see 5 C.

SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PE-

RIOD 1836-1864, at 378-82, 392-93 (1974).
69. See I G. HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 24-27 (1872). The

Hoar affair was a subject of frequent congressional discussion in the quarter-century

immediately preceding the Reconstruction era. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st
Sess. app. 1012-1013, 1556 (1854); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. 1661-1662
(1850).

516

[VOL. 22: 499, 1985]

A HistoricalInquiry
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

stated that his amendment would empower the federal government
to protect men such as Hoar, the proposal could hardly be viewed as
aimed only at racial discrimination.
A second key point is that throughout his January 9th speech,
Bingham evinced a belief that his proposed amendment would not
empower Congress to impose any new obligations upon the states.
Instead, he argued that the proposal would simply allow Congress to
enforce preexisting Constitutional constraints on the states - in particular, those constraints imposed by the comity clause. Further, he
plainly implied that the notion of "equal and exact justice" which he
had in mind, did not encompass the right of blacks to be free from
all racial discrimination; instead, he suggested that blacks in common with other citizens simply had an absolute right to judicial enforcement of their rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to freedom of conscience, to the culture and exercise of all
[their] faculties." His proposed Constitutional amendment would
simply state that if the states did not provide such judicial enforcement, the federal government could step in to supply the necessary
protection.
Soon after this speech, the proposed amendment was considered
by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction-of which Bingham was
a key member. After considerable maneuvering over the precise language to be used, 70 the Joint Committee reported a proposed Constitutional amendment which was quite similar to Bingham's original
proposal of December 6th:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary

and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States and to all persons in the
71 several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property.

The debate over this proposal focused mainly on its equal protection component. In his defense of the Committee's proposal on February 26, 27, and 28, Bingham reiterated the themes of his January
9th speech. First, in response to the suggestion that the proposed
amendment was aimed specifically at racial discrimination,7 2 Bingham stated that:
[I]t is proposed as well to protect the. . . loyal white citizens of the United
States whose property, by State legislation, has been wrested from them
under confiscation, and protect them also against banishment. 3
70. See J. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 49-51, 56-58, 60-62.
71. Id. at 62.
72. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866).
73. Id.

In dealing with the scope of the rights which Congress would have
authority to protect, he referred continually to the comity clause, the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, and the Bill of Rights

generally. On this point, Bingham first noted that Barron v. City of
Baltimore 4 and City of Livingston v. Moore5 clearly established

that the Bill of Rights was not formally binding on the states, and
thus that Congress had no authority to protect the rights of citizens

guaranteed by that document. He further contended, however, that
state officers were at least morally bound to respect the Bill of

Rights and other provisions of the federal Constitution by their oaths
of office, as well as the supremacy clause, and continued:
The adoption of the proposed amendment will take from the States no
rights that belong to the States. They elect their Legislatures; they enact
their laws for the punishment of crimes against life, liberty, or property; but
in the event of the adoption of this amendment, if they conspire together to
enact laws refusing equal protection to life, liberty, or property, the Congress is thereby vested with power to hold them to answer before the bar of
the national courts for the violation of their oaths and of the rights of their
fellow-men. . . . Is the Bill of Rights to stand in our Constitution. . .a
mere dead letter? It is absolutely essential to the safety of the people that it
should be enforced ...
Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity
of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land
shall have equal protection6 in every State in this Union in the rights of life
and liberty and property.

Even more clearly than the January 9th speech, this passage indicates that in Bingham's view, the proposed amendment would not

have added any new substantive constraints on state action. Instead,
the proposal would simply have armed Congress with authority to
protect existing constitutional rights, as well as state-created interests in property. The same point had been made in an earlier Bingham response to a charge that the proposed amendment would enable Congress to usurp state authority over property:
Although this word property has been in your Bill of Rights from the year
1789 until this hour, who ever heard it intimated that anybody could have
property protected in any State until he owned or acquired property there
according to its local law or according to the law of some other State which
he may have carried hither? I undertake to say no one.
As to real estate, everyone knows that its acquisition and transmission
under every interpretation ever given to the word property as used in the
Constitution of the country are dependent exclusively upon the local law of
the State, save under a direct grant of the United States. But suppose any
person has acquired property not contrary to the laws of the State but in
accordance with its law, are they not to be equally protected in the enjoyment of it, or are they to be denied all protection? That is the question, and
74. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
75. Id. at 469.
76. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866).
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the whole question, so far as that part of the case is concerned.

But if the proposed amendment would not have granted Congress
authority to establish new substantive rights, what new powers would
it have created in the federal government? One possibility has already been suggested; Congress could provide punishment for those
state officials who refused to protect the rights of any class of citizens. Second, Congress could provide direct legal and physical protection for the rights of life, liberty, and property. This power is implied not only by the references to the Hoar affair, but also in the
following passage from Bingham's defense of the proposed
amendment:
I commend especially to [an opponent of the amendment] the paper issued
by [a former Secretary of State] touching the protection of the rights of
Martin Kosta, a citizen of the United States, whose rights were invaded
abroad, within the jurisdiction of the empire of Austria. Commodore Ingraham gave notice that he would fire upon their town and their shipping unless they respected the rights of a declared citizen of the American Republic. You had the power to enforce your demand. But you were powerless in
time of peace in the presence of the laws of South Carolina, Alabama, and
Mississippi as States admitted and restored to the Union to enforce the
rights of citizens of the United States within their limits.7 8

In summary, then, Bingham did not view the proposed constitutional amendment as being race-focused or, indeed, aimed at the
general problem of class-based discrimination at all. Instead, he saw
the proposal as simply arming the federal government with authority
to guarantee that all persons-both white and black-would be protected in rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution, as well as
whatever rights were guaranteed to them by state law. Others, however, feared that the proposal had broader implications. This fear
was largely responsible for the decision to postpone consideration on
the proposal. After this decision, the Bingham proposal seemed
moribund.
Bingham, however, was not prepared to give up the idea of a constitutional amendment which would incorporate the principles of
equal protection. In the debate over the Civil Rights Bill, he argued
that his amendment was necessary to empower Congress to pass the
Bill. 79 Among mainstream Republicans, however, he was in a distinct minority on this point. Notwithstanding Bingham's objections,
the Civil Rights Bill was passed over the veto of President Johnson.
At this stage, the Joint Committee turned to the preparation of an
77.

Id. at 1090.

78.

Id. at 1090.

79. Id. at 1291-92.

omnibus constitutional amendment which would embody the major
elements of the Republican reconstruction program. Initially, the
Committee focused on a proposal presented by Robert Owen, which
provided in part that "[N]o discrimination shall be made by any
State nor by the United States as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."80 Bingham,
however, continually pressed for the addition of a provision including
equal protection language. 81 Initially, after a protracted struggle, he
was defeated in his efforts to add such a provision to the proposed
constitutional amendment. But eventually, Bingham persuaded the
Joint Committee to replace the "[N]o discrimination. . .because of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude" with the following
language:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. . .Section Five. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."

When the proposed fourteenth amendment was reported to the

House floor, debate focused primarily not on section 1, but rather on
section 3. Nonetheless, Bingham did discuss the proposed section 1
in a fairly extensive speech on May 10th:
The necessity for the first section [is that] [t]here was a want hitherto. . .in
the. . .United States by express authority of the Constitution to do that by
Congressional enactment which hitherto they have not had the power to do
and had never even attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be
abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State ...
• . .[T]his amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to
it. No State ever had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny
to any free man the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges
or immunities of any citizens of the Republic.
The second section [of the proposed fourteenth amendment] excludes the
conclusion that by the first section, suffrage is subjected to congressional
law; save, indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people of each
State to a Republican government and to choose their Representatives in
Congress is of the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amendment might
be given directly for a case supposed by Madison, where treason might
change a State government from a Republican to a despotic government
and thereby deny suffrage to the people. . .I beg leave. . .to say, that many
instances of State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the
State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guaranteed privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national Government
furnished and could furnish by law no remedy whatever. . ..
[T]he words of the Constitution that "the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities in the several States include,
80. See J. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 83.
81. See id. at 85-87, 98-99.
82. See id. at 106, 117.
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among other privileges, the right to bear true allegiance to the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and to be protected in life, liberty and property. . . But, sir [the loyal citizenry] looked in vain for any grant of
power in the Constitution by which to give protection to the citizens of the
United States resident in South Carolina against the infamous provision of
the ordinance which required them to abjure the allegiance which they
owed their country. It was an opprobrium to the Republic that for fidelity
to the United States they could not by national law be protected against the
degrading punishment inflicted on slaves and felons by State law. The great
want of the citizen and stranger, protection by the national law from unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied by the first section of [the proposed
fourteenth] amendment. That is the extent that it hath, no more .... 83

Once again, the essence of Bingham's position on section 1 is
clear. He plainly viewed it as a unified whole. Further, the function
of section 1 was neither to prohibit racial discrimination nor to add
any new constitutional constraints on the States. Instead, the focus
of this provision was simply to arm Congress with authority to protect the citizenry against encroachments on those rights already established by the comity clause and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
The structure of the discussion of the right of suffrage is particularly significant. In general, the Constitution leaves the regulation of
suffrage to the states. Therefore, section 1 does not grant Congress
general authority to effect such state regulations. By contrast, the
right to a republican form of government is established by an extrinsic constitutional provision; thus, Bingham concluded that Congress
could enforce this right under the equal protection clause.
The May 10th speech thus fits comfortably into the pattern which
Bingham's analysis followed throughout the first session of the
Thirty-ninth Congress. The same themes recur in his congressional
pronouncements after the fourteenth amendment had been ratified.
Indeed, the clearest summary of Bingham's view of the concept of
equal protection was presented in the debate over the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871.
[The equal protection clause] means that no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the Constitution of the United
States... and, of course, that no State should deny to any such person any
of the rights which are guaranteed to all men, nor should any State deny to
any such person any right secured to8 4him either by the laws and treaties of
the United States or of such States.

The remarkable aspect of this description is that Bingham does not
refer to classifications at all. Instead, he states that the equal
83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542-43 (1866).
84. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 83 (1871) (emphasis added).

protection clause guarantees: (1) any person (2) equal protection of
(3) rights established either by the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, or the laws of the particular state where the person
happens to be located. Put another way, by its own force the equal
protection clause does not prohibit discrimination in the granting of
substantive rights; instead, the clause merely requires that the states
make available on equal terms the mechanism necessary to enforce
the rights created either by other provisions of the Constitution or by
state law. Presumably, those mechanisms include state agencies
which prevent infringement on rights-the police-as well as the
bodies which rectify or punish violations of rights-the courts.
Where the states fail in their obligation to make these mechanisms
available, section 5 gives Congress the authority to intervene in order
to ensure "equal protection of the laws."
To summarize, then, Bingham's pronouncements consistently reflect the view that the equal protection clause was not intended to
add any additional prohibitions on discrimination against particular
classes. Instead, the clause simply required that all persons be provided the mechanisms for enforcement of rights established by other
aspects of the law. But while he was the single most important figure
in the development of section 1, Bingham was not the only actor on
the political stage. The next section will thus examine other evidence
on the intended meaning of the equal protection clause.
OTHER MAJOR DISCUSSIONS OF SECTION ONE IN THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS

While Bingham was primarily responsible for the language of section 1, he was not the only member of Congress to comment on the
proposed equal protection clause. Although the debates focused primarily on other sections of the proposed constitutional amendment,
the record of the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress contains a
number of comments on the concept of "equal protection of the
laws." Unfortunately, most are of such a general nature as to be of
little use in ascertaining the congressional understanding of the provision. Nonetheless, the discussions which reflect the thinking of the
Joint Committee as a whole must be given serious consideration.
These include the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
and the speeches introducing the proposed amendment in the House
and Senate, respectively.

The Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
Although issued too late to influence the congressional debate over
the fourteenth amendment, the Report of the Joint Committee on
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Reconstruction8 5 is a key source for the understanding of the equal
protection clause. As the explanation of the body responsible for section 1 (and the fourteenth amendment as a whole), pronouncements
from the report weigh heavily in arguments over the intended meaning of section 1. Unfortunately, the report primarily concerned itself
with arguing the status of the defeated southern states and the paramount authority of Congress on Reconstruction issues. 86 The only
direct references to section 1 simply refer to the necessity of "providing such constitutional. . .guarantees as will tend to secure the civil
rights of all citizens of the republic"81 and of making "changes [in]
the organic law as shall determine the civil rights and privileges of

all citizens in all parts of the republic ..

.""

No more precise defi-

nition is given of the rights protected. On two points, however, the
Joint Committee Report provides significant reinforcement for Bingham's analysis of the concept of equal protection.
First, the Report clearly implies that while the welfare of the
freed slaves was an important concern of the Committee, section 1
was intended to protect the rights of whites as well. As already
noted, the Report speaks of the necessity to secure the civil rights of
"all men." Moreover, the need for this amendment was due to the
fact that "[in the South] the general feeling and disposition among
all classes are yet totally adverse to the toleration of any class of
people friendly to the Union, be they white or black." 9
On the subject of voting rights, the Report is more emphatic, stating clearly that the amendment was deliberately crafted to allow the
states to retain all authority which they possessed under the original
Constitution. The discussion of voting came in the context of the
analysis of section 2, which altered the basis of representation. Although noting the unfairness of race-based suffrage requirements,
the Committee clearly stated the intent to leave state control over
suffrage untouched.9 0
85. REPORT
Press ed. 1969).

OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION

86.

See, e.g., id. at VII-XVIII.

87.

Id. at XVIII.

88.

Id. at XXI.

(Negro University

89. Id. at XVII (emphasis added).
90. Doubts were entertained whether Congress had power . . . to prescribe
the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act directly on the subject. It was
doubtful in the opinion of your committee, whether the States would consent to
surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached.
As the best if not the only method of surmounting the difficulty, and as eminently just and proper in itself, your committee came to the conclusion that

In short, the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
sheds some light on the intended meaning of the equal protection
clause. The evidence, however sparse, is however, entirely consistent
with the basic conclusion that the clause was seen as guaranteeing a
narrow spectrum of rights to all races. By contrast, the evidence is
totally inconsistent with race-focused theories of the concept of equal
protection.
The Presentationsto the House and Senate
Although Bingham played the primary role in drafting section 1,
the task of presenting and explaining the proposal in the full House
and Senate was carried out by other members of the Committee. As
senior House member on the Joint Committee, Thaddeus Stevens
presented the Committee plan on the House floor. Normally the
analogous duties in the Senate would have been performed by William Pitt Fessenden, the chairman of the Joint Committee. Fessenden, however, was temporarily disabled by illness; and this responsibility fell to Jacob Howard.
Stevens' Presentation
Stevens' discussion of section 1 was somewhat truncated. After arguing that each of the three clauses were contained "in some form or
other" in either the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution
as it existed, Stevens continued:
But the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect [sic] and allows
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law
which operates upon one man shall apply equally upon all. Whatever law
punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the black man in precisely
the same way and precisely the same degree. Whatever law protects the
white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black man. Whatever
means of address is afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law
allows the 1white man to testify in court shall allow the man of color to do
the same.

Steven's explanation of section 1 is largely undifferentiated. Thus,
it is somewhat difficult to make firm judgments on the precise relationship of his statement to specific clauses. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn regarding Stevens' understanding of the scope
of the proposal.
First, his assertion that the amendment requires that laws operate
political power should be possessed in all the States exactly in proportion as the
right of suffrage should be granted, without distinction of color or race. This it
was thought would leave the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to all the advantage of increased political power as an inducement to
allow all to participate in its exercise.
Id. at XIII.
91. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
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equally is an assertion of the principle of limited absolute equality
rather than total racial equality. It is tied to Stevens' statement that
the amendment gives Congress the power to enforce provisions of the
Constitution which had previously bound only the federal government - an echo of the assertions made by Bingham and Howard
with respect to the comity clause. 2 Since the principles of the comity clause are embodied in the privileges and immunities clause,
which in turn embraces the concept of limited absolute equality, Stevens' endorsement of the principle of equality should be taken to refer to the privileges and immunities clause.
Conversely, Stevens apparently had a quite limited conception of
the equal protection clause. His explanation seems to have separated
that clause from both the general right to equality and the right to
immunity from unequal punishment. That is, it connected equal protection only with the right to go to testify and to sue for redress of
grievances. This interpretation obviously fits comfortably with the
right to protection.
The discussion of racial discrimination in punishment was more
ambiguous. First, as already noted, this prohibition did not seem to
be connected with the equal protection clause. In other contexts,
some members of the Thirty-ninth Congress had indicated that this
prohibition was implicit in the privileges and immunities clause;93 a
contemporaneous treatise on state constitutional law suggested that
the concept of due process included analogous limitations of State
power.
Even if associated with the equal protection clause, the discussion
of racial discrimination in punishment cannot be taken as authority
for the proposition that the clause positted a general right to be free
from racial discrimination. Kent, it must be remembered, positted a
right to be protected from certain types of government actions, including unjust punishment.9 5 If (as the debates over the Civil Rights
Bill suggest) the thirteenth amendment was intended to establish the
proposition that race was an arbitrary ground on which to base punishment,96 then prohibition of racial discrimination in punishment
92. See id. at 157-58 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id. at 2765-66 (remarks of
Sen. Howard).

93.
Cowan).

See id. at 1117 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id. at 501 (remarks of Sen.

94. See
& n.2, 390-91
95. See
96. See

T. COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 351-53
(Da Capo ed. 1868).
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115-19 (1866) (remarks of Rep.

might be seen as being within this right to protection. But this right
was limited to criminal proceedings, taxation, and eminent domain
proceedings; it did not apply generally to, for example, a right to
government gratuities. Thus, even if the discussion of punishment is
related to the equal protection clause, the discussion does not suggest
that the clause was intended to prohibit racial discrimination
generally.
Howard's Presentation
Howard's discussion of section 1 in the Senate was far more extensive. Much of his attention was directed toward the "curious question" of "what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States." On this point he focused primarily on Corfield v.
J 9 7 and the Bill of Rights. He then continued:
Coryell
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State

from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person,

whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This
abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice

of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another. It
prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is
not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a

citizen with the same shield which it throws over the white man. Is it not

time, Mr. President, that we extend to the black man, I had almost called it

the poor privilege of the equal protection of the law? Ought not the time to
be now passed when one measure of justice is to be meted out to the member of another caste, both castes being like citizens of the United States,
both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens of the same Government, and both equally responsible to justice and to God for the deeds
done in the body?98

It spoke broadly of abolishing "all class legislation" and condemned the practice of having "one measure of justice. . .meted out
to a member of one caste while another and a different measure is
meted out to the member of another caste." Howard's statements
can be interpreted as at least prohibiting all forms of racial discrimination, and perhaps other types of unfair discrimination as well.
Alternative interpretations are also plausible, however. For instance, the only specific example of class legislation cited by Howard
was "the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white
man is not to be hanged." If class legislation is intended to refer only
to criminal laws, then, the analysis is entirely consistent with a limited vision of the scope of equal protection. Similarly, the reference
to different measures of justice might be viewed as a discussion of
remedies, rather than a matter of equality of rights. Other portions
Wilson) (by implication); id. at 1123-24 (remarks of Rep. Cook).
97. 4 F. Cas. 371, (Wash. C.C. 1825) (No. 3230).
98. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
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of Howard's presentation lend considerable support to this interpretation. For example in discussing section 5 he stated:
I look upon the first section, taken in connection with the fifth, as very
important. It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of
them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who
may happen to be within their jurisdiction. It established equality before
the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the
race the same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to
the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty. . . Without
this principle of equal justice to all men and equal protection under the
is no republican government, and none that is really
shield of the law, there
worth maintaining.9

Plainly, Howard saw the concept of "equal protection" as analytically separate from that of "equal rights." This analysis is most
plausibly understood in terms of the limited concept of protection
developed by Blackstone and Kent.
Further, Howard's discussion of the effect of section 1 on the right
to vote clearly indicates that his understanding of the conception of
"equal rights" to be constitutionalized was that of limited absolute
equality rather than total racial equality. He argued:
The first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of
these classes the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of
the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely
the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights
lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist
except as slaves, subject to a despotism.100

Taken together with the sharp distinction drawn between equal
rights and equal protection, this passage suggests that Howard's understanding of section 1 was much like that of Bingham. The basic
constitutional minimum of rights was to be established by the privileges and immunities clause; the equal protection clause was primarily intended to insure access to the means of enforcing those rights.
But if a right were not embodied in the privileges and immunities
clause, if it were merely a "creature of law," then section 1 would
leave it entirely within state control.
Contrary Evidence
While the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and
the statements of Stevens and Howard were the official Republican

explanations of section 1, many other Republicans spoke on the issue
99. Id. at 2766 (emphasis added).
100. Id.

of the meaning of the equal protection clause during the Reconstruction era. Not surprisingly, these statements showed a diversity of interpretation. Some provide support for a limited conception of the
phrase "equal protection of the laws"; 01 others are so vague and
02
general as to be of little use in establishing congressional intent.1
But some may be taken to reflect a broad understanding of the concept of equal protection.
During the debates over section 1 during the first session of the
Thirty-ninth Congress, the Radical Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsin discussed the application of the equal protection clause to
Florida's school system. Under Florida's system, both whites and
blacks were taxed to support a school system for whites, but only
blacks were taxed to support a black school system. The black system was woefully inadequate. This situation,
Howe argued, would be
10 3
prohibited by the equal protection clause.
One of the difficulties in interpreting Howe's speech lies in its ambiguity; it is unclear whether he intended to condemn the inequality
in taxation or the inequality in the two school systems. If taxation
were the problem, then Howe's position is readily assimilable to
Kent's conception of protection from the government. If the core of
his complaint was the state of the black school system, on the other
hand, the implications of his statement are much broader.
Such broad implications are more clearly evident in a group of
statements made in later Congresses. Typical is a statement by Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana during debate in 1872:
I desire to inquire what is meant by "the equal protection of the laws"
which a State shall not deprive any person of? To what does the word "protection" refer? Does it mean that the State shall not deprive a man of the
equal protection of the law for his person? Will any one contend that it
shall have a construction so narrow as that? Will it be contended that it
means that a State shall not deprive a person of the equal protection of the
law for his property; that it shall be confined to that? I submit that when it
declares that no State shall deprive any person of the equal protection of
the laws, it means substantially that no person shall be deprived by a State
of the equal benefit for the laws; that the word "protection," as there used,
means not simply the protection of the person from violence, the protection
of his property from destruction, but it is substantially in the sense of the
equal benefit of the law; that it is intended 10to promote equality in the
States, and it refers to the laws of the States. 4

One finds similar sentiments expressed from time to time by men
101. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 69 (1871) (remarks of
Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 608 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Cincinnati Commercial, Sept. 24,
1866, at 2, col. 2 (remarks of Gov. Morton); id., Sept. 9, 1866, at 2, col. 2 (remarks of
William Dickson).
102. See, e.g., CoNb. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2539 (1866) (remarks of Rep,
Farnsworth); id. at 2465 (remarks of Rep. Thayer).
103. Id., app. 210.
104. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 846-47 (1872). See also 3 CONG. REC.
1793 (1875) (statement of Rep. Boutwell).

A Historical Inquiry

[VOL. 22: 499. 1985]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

such as Representative William Lawrence of Ohio10 5 and of Representative George Boutwell of Massachusetts. 0 6
The weight of this evidence is reduced by a number of factors.
First, as post-hoc statements, they are less persuasive than contemporaneous statements. Second, typically these statements were made
in the context of attempts to establish the constitutional authority of
Congress to pass particular laws. Thus, they are "law office history,"
intended to persuade rather than enlighten. Finally, while men such
as Howe and Lawrence were present during the debates over the
fourteenth amendment, and Boutwell was a member of the Joint
Committee, there is no evidence that any of the advocates of broad
construction were particularly influential in the drafting of section 1.
Thus, their views are not necessarily dispositive.
If other contextual factors pointed to a broad congressional intent,
these statements would provide sufficient support to infer such an
intent. However, these other factors, in fact support a contrary inference. The next section focuses on factors which mitigate against an
inference of broad intent.
OTHER CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Evolution of Language

Further support for the theory that the concept of "equal protection of the laws" was not intended to establish any new substantive
rights against class-based discrimination is provided by the evolution
of the language of the clause during the first session of the Thirtyninth Congress. The essence of the argument made against Bingham's Congressional power proposal was the breadth of the language
"life, liberty, and property." Robert Hale of New York delivered the
main attack on the Bingham proposal:
[t]he language [of the proposal] in its grammatical legal construction... is
a grant of the fullest and most ample power to Congress to make all laws
"necessary and proper" to secure to all persons in the States protection on
the rights of life, liberty and property: with the same proviso that such protection shall be equal. It is not a mere provision that when the State undertakes to give protection which is unequal, Congress may equalize it; it is a
grant of power in general terms-a grant of the right to legislate for the
protection of life, liberty, and property, simply qualified with the condition
that it shall be equal legislation... [W]e all know it is true that probably
every State in this Union failed to give equal protection to all persons
within its borders in the rights of life, liberty and property .... Take the
105. CONG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1874).
106. Id. at 1793.

case of the rights of married women; did anyone ever assume that Congress
was to be invested with the power to legislate on that subject, and to say
that married women in regard to their rights or property
should stand on
10 7
the same footing with men and unmarried women?

Thaddeus Stevens attacked the example arguing that "[w]hen a
distinction is made between two married women and two femmes
sole, then it is unequal legislation; but where all of the same class
are dealt with in the same way, then there is no pretense of inequality." 10 8 Hale, however, would not accept this explanation:
The language of the section under consideration gives to all persons equal
protection. Now, if that means you shall extend to one married woman the
same protection you extend to another, and not the same you extend to
unmarried women or men, then by parity of reasoning it will be sufficient if
you extend to one negro the same rights you would do to another, but not
those you extend to a white man I think, if [Representative Stevens] claims
that the resolution only intends that all of a certain class shall have equal
protection, such class legislation may certainly as easily satisfy the require-

ments of this resolution in the case of the negro as in the case of the married woman. The line of distinction is, I take it, quite as broadly marked

between negros and white men as between married and unmarried
9
women.""

In summary, Hale's argument was that the Bingham proposal was
flawed in that it would create a revolution in federalism by granting
the federal government plenary authority over vast areas previously
reserved to the states -

the protection of life, liberty, and property.

The difficulty with the addition of the concept of equality, Hale asserted, is not that it was a bad idea per se, but rather that it would
not have imposed a significant limitation on the federal government's
ability to legislate generally on the subject of life, liberty, and property under the Bingham amendment. These arguments were largely
responsible for the refusal of the House of Representatives to adopt
the initial Bingham proposal.110
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-64 (1866).
108. Id. at 1264.
109. Id.
110. See also, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1083-87 (1866) (remarks
of Rep. Davis); id. at 1095 (remarks of Rep. Conkling) (by implication).
Advocates of a broad construction of the equal protection clause often cite the objections of the Radical Giles Hotchkiss, who pointed to the fact that the initial Bingham
proposal did not directly constrain the States, but only granted power to Congress. Id. at
1095. In evaluating the impact of Hotchkiss' objections, however, two other factors must
also be considered. First, no alteration was necessary to secure the support of most Radicals; in general, they were perfectly willing to accept the Bingham proposal. See id. at
1057-62 (remarks of Rep. Kelly); id. at 1054-57 (remarks of Rep. Higby). Even more
importantly, Hotchkiss also objected to the potentially broad implications of the Bingham language. He stated:
I understand the amendment as now proposed by its terms to authorize Congress to establish uniform laws throughout the United States upon the subject
[of] the protection of life, liberty and property. I am unwilling that Congress
shall have any such power.... It is not indulging in imagination to any great
stretch to suppose that we may have a Congress here that would establish such
rules in my State as I would be unwilling to be governed by.
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The key question thus becomes what factors moved the House to
reach a different result when pressed to vote on section 1. One suggestion, is that despite the changes in the final draft of section 1, the
final version of that section would have been subjected to the same
criticism as Bingham's proposal, and that, therefore, the Framers
should be presumed to have intended the results feared by Hale.
TenBroek argues that:
[n]ot all changes in legislative proposals are aimed at conciliating or removing objections. Some are made to strengthen a proposal in order to better
achieve an objective, the sponsors having determined to proceed despite the
consequences predicted by critics, or perhaps even for the very purpose of
bringing those consequences about."' 1

Whatever the merit of such arguments in the abstract, the circum-

stances surrounding the changes in the language decisively refute
this contention with respect to section 1. As already noted, Bingham

himself consistently denied any intention to achieve the result suggested by Hale; for example, Bingham explicitly stated that the

states would retain the right to prescribe preconditions for ownership
of property. Moreover, when the current section 1 was proposed as a

substitute for an amendment which would have simply prohibited racial discrimination with respect to "civil rights" -

a clearly limited

proposal which would not have been subject to Hale's objections

-

the substitute attracted the votes of virtually all of the more con-

servative members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, while
more radical elements of the Joint Committee formed the majority
of the opposition.
The voting pattern of Roscoe Conkling of New York on this issue
is illustrative. Conkling was clearly a part of the Republican mainstream; indeed, he was quite radical on some issues.112 On issues of
race relations and the extension of the power of the federal government generally, however, he was on the extreme conservative edge of
the Republican mainstream. On statutory issues, he voted to limit

both the District of Columbia Suffrage Bill'

and the Civil Rights

Id. at 1095.
It was only "the very privileges which [Bingham] is contending for" - i.e., those guaranteed by the comity clause - that Hotchkiss wished to have secured by a new amendment. Thus on this point the opposition to the original Bingham proposal was of a single
mind.
11. J. TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 217.
112. See, e.g., J. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 106 (addition of disenfranchisement provision to proposed amendment); id. at 105 (addition of disqualification
provision).
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1866); id. at 310.

Bill.114 On constitutional issues considered by the Joint Committee,
his conservative pattern was even more pronounced. Conkling was
one of the only two Republicans to vote against reporting Bingham's
initial proposal, 11 5 and also voted against adding the current section
1 as an addition to the prohibition on racial discrimination in civil
rights."' Yet when the Bingham language was proposed as a substitute for the "civil rights" language, Conkling voted in favor of the
substitution. 11 7 He was joined not only by other Moderates such as
Senator George Williams of Oregon and Representative Henry Blow
of Missouri, but also by all three Democrats on the Joint Committee
in short, with only one exception, all of the men who would be
most likely to vote in favor of restricting the proposal. Thus, the
most plausible interpretation is that section 1 as adopted was less
intrusive on the established system of federalism than a simple prohibition on racial discrimination in civil rights, and as such, it was
not viewed as subject to the criticisms which Hale had leveled at the
initial Bingham proposal.
This conclusion is reinforced by the course of the floor debates on
the Joint Committee proposal. During the course of those debates, a
number of Republicans criticized various aspects of the proposed
constitutional amendment and suggested changes in the committee
draft. Yet none of the Republicans who had voiced federalism-based
concerns regarding Bingham's initial proposal-Conkling,11 8 Hale,1119
22
12
Representatives Davis1 20 and Hotchkiss, ' and Senator Stewart
voiced similar objections to section 1 as ultimately proposed by
the Joint Committee.1 23 Indeed, Stewart was one of those who
114. Id. at 1296.
115. J. JOINT COMMITrEE, supra note 7, at 57, 61-62.
116. Id. at 98.
117. Id. at 106-07.
118. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (by implication).
119. See id. at 1064-66.
120. See id. at 1083-87.
121. See id. at 1095.
122. See id. at 1082-83.
123. Nearly a decade later, Hale did suggest that the language ultimately adopted
had the same flaws as the original Bingham proposals. Answering contentions that the
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1875 was beyond Congressional authority, Hale contended
that:
I will remember . . . that . . . standing alone in my party, [I opposed] the
fourteenth amendment upon the ground that it did change the constitutional
powers of legislation of Congress [and that section five] was to a certain extent a
revolution of our form of government in giving Congress a control of matters
which had hitherto been confined exclusively to state control.
3 CONG. REC. 979-80 (1875) (emphasis in original).
The difficulty with this statement is that it is historically inaccurate. While he was
against the original Bingham proposal, Hale voted in favor of the fourteenth amendment
in its final form. Moreover, there is no record of his having voiced reservations regarding
section one. Thus his 1875 comments can be dismissed as simple law office history.
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pressed for adding a definition of citizenship to the protections of

section 1.124
One possible explanation for this change of position is that change
from the "positive" form ("Congress shall have power to make all
laws necessary and proper") to the "negative" form, including a direct prohibition on state action together with the simple statement

that "Congress shall have power to enforce" the prohibition. In an
era where Congress rather than the Supreme Court was viewed as

the primary enforcer of constitutional rights, the latter formulation
can be viewed as having a less drastic effect on the existing
balance
125

of power between the states and national government.

Despite Bingham's denial that he intended the shift from the posi-

tive to negative form to have any such import, 26 the change in lan-

guage no doubt pleased the more conservative Moderates. At the

very least the negative form recognized the states' primacy in establishing and maintaining individual rights, with Congress given authority to intervene only when the states were remiss in fulfilling
their obligations. 127 This change, however, cannot fully explain the
actions of the Moderates, for in the Joint Committee Moderates and
Democrats had preferred the Bingham language
to another "nega28

tive" provision -

the original Owen proposal.

124. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2560 (1866).
In discussing the proposed amendment, Stewart did note the "increasing danger of
consolidated and despotic government so long as the national government strives to protect negro and white loyalists in the South." Id. at 2964. This statement did not seem to
refer to dangers inherent in section I in particular, but rather to the general difficulties
associated with delays in reconstructing the defeated southern States.
125. James Garfield, who had been a member of the Thirty-ninth Congress, made
this argument in 1871. Comparing the initial Bingham formulation with that which was
eventually adopted, he contended:
The one exerts its force directly upon the States, laying restriction and limitations upon their power and enabling Congress to enforce these limitations. The
other, the rejected proposition, would have brought the power of Congress to
bear directly upon the citizens, and contained a clear grant of power to Congress
to legislate directly for the protection of life, liberty, and property within the
States. The [enacted form] limited but did not oust the jurisdiction of the State
over the subject. The [rejected form] gave Congress plenary power to cover the
whole subject with its jurisdiction and, as it seems to me, to the exclusion of the
State authority.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 150-51 (1871).
126. Id. at app. 83-84. See also J. TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 221 (contending
that the Garfield argument is linguistically untenable).
127. See Ohio Exec. Document, Part 1, No. 282 (1867), quoted in C. FAIRMAN,
DoEs THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT INCORPORATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS 5, 96 (1949);
M. BENEDICT, supra note 12, at 170.
128. See J. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 106-07.

On its face, this voting pattern was somewhat anomalous. As already noted, Moderates had strongly criticized the potentially sweeping implications of Bingham's earlier equal protection proposal. 12
By contrast, although its reach was uncertain in some respects, the
Owen proposal was clearly limited to matters involving racial discrimination. Thus, one might have thought that the Moderates
would have preferred this formulation to the Bingham language.
The key to the Moderate action lies in another important change
in the equal protection language - the change from "equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, or property" to simply "equal protection of the laws." As noted above, the main objection to the original Bingham proposal was that it granted Congress plenary
authority over all matters of life, liberty, and property and the requirement that legislation provide "equal protection" was not a substantial limitation on this power. But if (as Binghafih suggested in
1871) the term "laws" encompassed only those rights protected by
the Constitution and those already guaranteed to individuals by state
law, then the objections of men such as Hale, Davis, and Conkling
would be satisfied. Congress could only supply to an individual protection in rights already guaranteed to him either by the Constitution or state law. Congress could not define these substantive rights,
and thus the power of the states would remain largely intact.
This circumstantial evidence provides important corroboration for
Bingham's expressed analysis of the equal protection clause. Further
support is provided by the terms in which the opponents of the fourteenth amendment expressed their objections.
The Democratic Position
Attempting to discover the intent of the drafters of any piece of
legislation from the statements of opponents is at best a perilous enterprise. Typically, in attempting to defeat proposed legislation, opponents will bring forth a parade of horribles, greatly exaggerating
the effect of the proposals.' 3 Thus, if one depends on opposition
129. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
130. To illustrate this point, one need only examine the debates over Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1980). During the course of
those debates, one of the proposal's prominent opponents stated that:
Title VII . . . would rob every American having as many as 25 employees in
any business or industrial enterprise affecting interstate commerce of those precious rights which the founders of our country came here to enjoy. The bill
would give the Federal Government the power to go into any business or industry in the United States having as many as 25 employees and affecting interstate commerce and tell the operator of that business whom he had to hire. It
would give the Federal Government the power to go into any such business or
any such industry and determine whom the employer had to promote. It would
give the Federal Government the power to go into any such business or industry
and tell the operator of that business whom he should lay off and whom he
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statements, he or she might conclude that a given bill was intended
to have a much broader impact than was actually contemplated.
One encounters similar problems in dealing with the legislative
history of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. Men such as Andrew Rogers of New Jersey and George S. Shanklin of Kentucky
were attempting to defeat the fourteenth amendment. Thus, it was in
their best interest to portray section 1 as destructive of the basic
fabric of American federalism. 13 1 But as actual indicia of the intent
of the drafters of section 1, their statements in opposition are unreliable. Thus, those who depend on opposition statements to support a
broad reading of section 1132 make a fundamental error.
One can, however, draw negative inferences from the failure of
opposition spokesmen to attack a particular provision. The fourteenth amendment was exhaustively debated both in Congress and in
the election campaign of 1866. During these debates, Democrats attacked the proposed amendment from every conceivable angle, often
showing themselves willing to engage in the grossest exaggeration of
its likely effects. Thus, a failure to attack a particular provision is
evidence that the provision was widely understood not to effect a significant change in the federal system and was therefore generally
uncontroversial.
Of course, section 1 as a whole was subjected to its share of attack
during the debates and the subsequent campaign. Many of these attacks were couched in the most general terms, not identifying any

should retain in times of financial adversity.
...[T]he bill would go further than that. It would give the Federal Government the power to go into such business and industry, and even direct the operator of such business or industry as to how he should fix the rates of compensation as between employees.
The bill is broad enough in its provisions ... to authorize the Federal Government to undertake to tell the operator of a business or industry what the
workload of his employees should be....
Under ... the bill the Federal Government would have the power to say to a
business or an industry how many employees it should have.
1 10 CONG. REC. 13077 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
Relying only on this passage, one might well conclude that Title VII was intended to
give the Federal Government broad authority to regulate all aspects of business and industry. But, in fact, this is a gross exaggeration; Title VII was plainly only intended to
allow the government to act in relatively limited circumstances.
131. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2538 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Rogers); id. at 2500 (statement of Rep. Shanklin).
132. See, e.g., H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 78
(1908); J. TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 218-19; C. FAIRMAN, supra note 127, at 5, 4950.

particular clause as objectionable. 133 The focus of the more specific
attacks is, however, quite instructive. The overwhelming majority of
these attacks focused on the privileges and immunities clause13 4 and
the citizenship clause added by the Senate. 135 The due process clause

was also derided in a number of published discussions of the amendment."3 6 By contrast, critics typically ignored the equal protection
clause; Democrats did not specifically criticize this provision during
the Congressional debates, and attacks on the concept of equal pro13

tection during the ensuing political campaign were also quite rare,

7

Indeed, there were significant indications that the opposition was

amenable to the theory of guaranteeing "equal protection of the
laws." For example, Reverdy Johnson, one of the less conservative
Democrats and the most brilliant opposition theoretician, although
opposing the privileges and immunities clause, 38 voted in favor of
the equal protection clause in the Joint Committee. 139 Similarly, on
the Senate floor, Edgar Cowan - a nominal Republican who consistently supported the Democrats on Reconstruction issues - suggested that he was in favor of legally establishing the right of all
people to "the protection of the laws while [the person] is within and
under the jurisdiction of the courts." 40 Perhaps the most striking
example of the attitude of the Democrats toward the concept of

equal protection is the minority report of the Joint Committee. The
minority report never directly addresses section 1. In another context, however, it states that:
Each citizen... of every State owes the same allegiance to the general
133. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2530 (1866) (remarks of Rep.
Randall); id. at 2500 (remarks of Rep. Shanklin); Charleston Courier, Nov, 1, 1866, at
2.
134. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3041 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Johnson); id. at 2538 (remarks of Rep. Rogers); id. at 2397-98 (remarks of Rep.
Phelps); Speech of George Pendleton, reported in Cincinnati Commercial, July 23, 1866,
at 2, col. 2; Letter from Ex-Provisional Gov. W.L. Sharkey of Minn. to B.G. Humphreys,
Gov. of Minn., reportedin N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1866, at 3, col. 1; PA. LEG. REc. app. at
iii (1867), quoted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 127, at 1114.
135. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Hendricks); id. at 2890-97 (remarks of Sen. Cowan); Speech of Clement L. Vallandingham, reported in Cincinnati Commercial, Oct. 6, 1866, at 2; Raleigh Sentinel,
June 20, 1866, at 2; WIS. SEN. J. 96 et. seq. (1867) quoted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note
127, at 108-09.
136. See Letter from O.H. Browning, Sec. of the Interior, to his constituents in
Illinois, published in N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1866, at 1, col. 4; Letter from George Weston, published in Nat. Intelligencer, July 10, 1866, at 2; E. McPhereson, Fourteenth
Amendment Scrapbook 24 (unpublished manuscript on file in Library of Congress).
137. The pages of the Cincinnati Commercial contain many examples of the
speeches (discussions) on the fourteenth amendment during the relevant period, as does
E. McPhereson, supra note 136.

138.

CONG. GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866).

139. J. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 85.
140. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2891 (1866). See also id. at 2919 (remarks of Sen. Davis).
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government and is entitled to the same protection. The obligation of this
allegiance. . .is made paramount and perpetual, and. . .it is equally the
paramount duty of the general government to allow to the citizens of each
State, and to the State, the rights secured to both and the protection necessary to their full enjoyment. 4"

This statement stands as an unequivocal commitment to the basic
concept of equal protection. By its terms, the statement applies only
to the right of protection from the federal government. But one must
remember that the major objection to section 1 was based on the
theory that Congress, through its enforcement power, would use the
fourteenth amendment as a device to intervene in state affairs. Thus,
coming from the political group most concerned with preserving
state autonomy, an endorsement of the basic concepts that the federal government already had the duty to provide the "same protection" to all citizens stands as important evidence that the equal protection clause was generally viewed as being of very little scope,
simply embodying a discrete right already belonging to all citizens,
either by virtue of natural law or by some provision of the unamended Constitution. Democrats may well have believed that the
right should be enforced at the state rather than the federal level,
but the existence of the right itself was uncontroversial.
Summary
The equal protection clause was apparently not intended primarily
as a safeguard against unfair classifications. Instead, it appears the
drafters were simply attempting to constitutionalize a principle
which would require statutes to provide the mechanism to protect
citizens in the exercise of extrinsically established legal rights. In the
fourteenth amendment context, the main provision establishing such
rights was the privileges and immunities clause. The question of the
intended scope of that clause thus becomes critical to any understanding of the equal protection clause.
A full discussion of the privileges and immunities clause is beyond
the scope of this Article. One crucial issue, however, must be resolved - did the drafters intend that the privileges and immunities
clause protect only a fixed set of rights, or was the precise scope of
that clause intended to change over time?

141.

H. REP. No. 30, pt. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1866). See also id. at 5.

THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Mainstream Republicans did not speak with one voice regarding
the intended meaning of the proposed privileges and immunities
clause. One finds references to the Civil Rights Act of 1866;142 the
Bill of Rights;'4 3 and antebellum case law such as Corfield v. Coryell."" Moreover, there seems to have been an understanding that the
precise boundaries 4of5 the concept of privileges and immunities were
somewhat unclear.
Seizing on this uncertainty, Democrats argued that the concept
was not only unclear, but could change over time. One of the most
common attacks on section 1 was based on the argument that despite
vigorous denials by the Republicans, the clause could and would be
used to force black suffrage on the states.'" There is considerable
evidence, however, that the understanding and intention of the Republican drafters was that the meaning of privileges and immunities
would remain fixed.
First, the same political and ideological factors which mitigate
against an open-ended interpretation of the equal protection clause
are present in the case of the privileges and immunities clause.' 47
Second, while the Republicans may not have been entirely certain
about what rights were protected by the privileges and immunities
clause, they were consistent and firm in arguing that state control
over suffrage would not be affected by section 1.148 Such an argument can only be made with confidence if the parameters of the proposed clause were assumed to be fixed.
Finally, and most significantly, John Bingham consistently expressed intentions which were inconsistent with the concept of an
142. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866) (remarks of Rep.
Thayer); id. at 475 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
143. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard);
id. at 1089-90 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); see generally H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK,
supra note 59, at 404-05 (and additional sources cited therein).
144. 4 F. Cas. 371 (C.C. Wash. 1825) (No. 3230); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard); id. at 475 (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull).
145. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard); id. at 41-42 (remarks of Sen. Sherman). See also id. at 3041 (remarks of Sen.
Johnson).
146. See, e.g., id. at 2538 (remarks of Rep. Rogers); Cincinnati Commercial, July
23, 1866, at 2, col. 2 (speech of George H. Pendleton); id. Oct. 6, at 2, (speech of
Clement Vallandingham); TEx. HousE J. 578 (1866), quoted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note
127, at 89-90; N.H. HousE J. 176, quoted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 127, at 176. See
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3041 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Johnson) (opposing privileges and immunities clause because "I do not understand what will be the effect
of that").
147. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Howard); id. at 2543 (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
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open-ended privileges and immunities clause. Beginning on January
9, 1866, and continuing through the debates, Bingham emphasized
that his objective was to provide a mechanism to assure the enforcement of guarantees which in his view were already in the Constitution - particularly those inherent in the comity clause. 149 Rather
than simply achieving this purpose, an open-ended clause would have
radically altered the federal/state balance of power
- an intention
150
which Bingham vigorously and repeatedly denied.
The clearest statement of Bingham's position on this point actually
came in 1871. The occasion was the House Judiciary Committee response to the memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, which requested
the passage of a statute requiring states to allow women to vote.
Woodhull claimed that Congress had the authority to pass such a
statute based on its power to enforce both the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses."
One of the interesting features of the report of the House Judiciary Committee is the light which it shed on the relationship between
the various clauses of section 1. Both the majority and minority reports treated the question of whether the right to vote was covered
by the privileges and immunities clause as dispositive. Even the minority report, which favored the passage of a woman's suffrage law,
did not argue that Congress could proceed under the equal protection clause independently of the privileges and immunities clause.
This pattern of argument further reinforces the impression that the
only new requirement imposed by the equal protection clause was
that the states provide protection for rights guaranteed elsewhere.
Bingham's majority report is also quite significant for the light
which it shed on his understanding of the concept of privileges and
immunities. Writing for the majority, he states:
The clause of the fourteenth amendment, "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those [guaranteed by the comity clause]. The fourteenth amendment, it is believed, did
not add to the privileges and immunities beforementioned but was deemed
necessary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon the power of
the States. It had been judicially determined that the first eight articles of
amendment of the Constitution was not limitations on the power of the
States, and it was apprehended that the5 same might be held as the provision
of the second section, for the article.' 2
149.
150.
151.
152.

See, e.g., id. at 1064; id. at 157-58.
See, e.g., id. at 1088-94.
See SEN. Misc. Doc. No. 16, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1871).
H. REP. No. 22, 41st Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1871).

The message could not be clearer. The privileges and immunities
clause was not intended to work any revolution in federalism, and
thus could not have been intended to be open-ended. Of course, one
might make the standard objection that the Judiciary Committee report was simply an advocacy piece prepared five years after the fact.
Two factors, however, limit the force of that objection in this context. First, the report was prepared by John Bingham, the author of
section 1. Second, it is entirely consistent with the statements which
Bingham made throughout 1866. Thus, the report of the House Judiciary Committee on the Woodhull Memorial stands as evidence
that the privileges and- immunities clause was not intended to be
open-ended.
CONCLUSION

No theory of the intent of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment is likely to be consistent with all of the evidence on the subject.
The evidence itself is not entirely consistent; moreover, a substantial
portion of it is simply ambiguous. Nonetheless, any such theory
should be consistent with most or all of the following:
1. The contemporaneous understanding of the concepts of "equality" and "protection".
2. The statements of John Bingham, the drafter of section 1.
3. The statements of most of those who could be characterized as
speaking for the body of the Republican Party on this issue.
4. The course of development of section 1.
5. The political and ideological climate of the early Reconstruction
era.
Classification-based theories of the equal protection clause fail to
meet these criteria. By contrast, a theory which focuses primarily on
a discrete right to protection and sees classification as being important only in view of specific limited areas fits most of the important
evidence. Thus, the latter theory is the most plausible.

